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ULTRAMARES REVISITED: A MODERN STUDY OF
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY TO THE PUBLIC
KENNETH IRA SOLOMON*
HE LAST few years have witnessed an increasing quantity of
lawsuits brought by third parties against accountants many of
which have involved claims for damages in the millions of
dollars.' A recent editorial in the leading professional periodical
pointed out that widespread publicity is given to suits against large
firms of accountants for "astronomical" amounts but small account-
ing firms are also being subjected to claims for amounts which, while
much less in absolute terms, would financially ruin the CPA-part-
ners if the litigation by the third parties were successful.2 The editorial
further went on to surmise that the cause of the sudden spurt in
such claims seems to be the fact that banks and other financial in-
stitutions are increasingly hoping that accounting firms can be made
a source of salvage when loans go bad or credit losses occur.'
This bit of conjecture might well be supported when the following
account from the Wall Street Journal is considered:
Four banks, including Bank of America, San Francisco, and Chase Manhattan
Bank, New York, are suing Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., a nationwide certified
public accounting concern for a total of $6,113,230 in damages.
* Mr. Solomon is the Associate Director of Education, Research and Professional De-
velopment for the firm of Laventhol Krekstein Horwath and Horwath. He received
both a B.S. and M.S. from the University of Illinois and a J.D. from the University of
Chicago. He is a member of the Illinois Bar and is a Certified Public Accountant. He
was an Assistant Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University Law School
and Associate Professor of Accounting and Business Law at Chicago City College. Mr.
Solomon is the author of PARTNERSHIPS-TAX AND ACCOUNTING TREATMENT (1964) and
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ACCOUNTING (1968). Articles by him have appeared in
various legal, accounting, and tax periodicals including: Georgetown Law Journal; Case
Western Reserve Law Review; American Bar Journal; Taxes-The Tax Magazine; Tax
Counselors Quarterly; and a recent article entitled "Riots, Congress and Interstate Com-
merce," in a study on the riots in Detroit published by the Journal of Urban Law. He
is a member of the Chicago Bar Association's Mock Trial and Federal Tax Committees
and a member of the American Judicature Society, American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, and the Decalogue Society of Lawyers' Civil Rights Commission.
1 The recent increase in suits directed against accounting firms is well diagramed by
Heinemann, Accountant Role Undergoing Test, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1966; Sec. 3,
at 1, col. 3.
2 Editorial, The Specter of Auditors' Liability, 120 J. Accy. (No. 3, September 1965) 33.
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The suits, filed in Main County Superior Court near San Francisco, charge that
the accounting firm issued statements that were "misleading" in some respects
about the finances for 1958 through 1960 of Otis, McAllister & Co., a large San
Francisco-based coffee importer declared bankrupt in 1963. Bank of America is
suing for $3,550,885 and Chase Manhattan for $1,132,990. In addition, Wells
Fargo Bank & Trust Co., San Francisco, claims $699,355, and Henry Schroder
Banking Corp., New York, seeks $730,000. Several individual partners of the
accounting company [firm] also were named defendants.
The plaintiffs charge that in the years at issue Otis-McAllister hadn't always
repaid a bank with proceeds from selling a specific lot of coffee the bank had
financed, but did so from proceeds of collateral pledged to another lender. The
banks contend that Peat, Marwick was aware of this situation or should have
known about it, and that its financial reports on the company failed to point up
the matter. A spokesman at Peat, Marwick's New York headquarters said the
company [firm] denied "absolute liability" in the case. He said the banks "had
reason to know what was going on, but they didn't do anything about it." At
one point, according to the accounting official, the banks offered to settle the
disputed liability for about $1.3 million. But, he said, Peat, Marwick's insurers
decided against this approach "and chose to have the matter litigated on its
merits." 4
Excerpts from the complaint which was filed in the Bank of America
case5 along with analytical comments thereon appear in Appendix B
of this study.6 This suit and the publicity it has spawned further serve
to illustrate that the number of accountant lawsuits, and the level of
damages being sought by third parties, are mounting steadily toward
unbelievable enormity.7 It is generally agreed upon by jurists and
legal commentators that the law of accountants' liability to third
parties, although giving the surface impression of well-settled doctrine,
is still far from being crystal clear even at this late and crucial date.
Our first step, then must be the consideration of what seem to be the
traditional concepts of the independent accountants' legal responsi-
bilities to third parties.
The standard of care applicable to the determination of whether an
independent accountant has exercised due care in his conduct of an
4 Accounting Firm Sued by 4 Banks jor a Total of $6,113,230 Damages, The Wall
Street Journal, May 15, 1965.
5 Bank of America v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., No. 42748 (Superior Court
of Main County, California, 1968).
6 Continuous correspondence between this writer and Eldon C. Parr, Counsel for
the Bank of America, has revealed that the case was only recently settled. Unfortunately,
the terms of the settlement did not permit him to disclose the details of the settlement.
Letter from Eldon C. Parr, Counsel, Bank of America, Legal Dept., San Francisco,
California, April 8, 1968. There can be little doubt about the felt need for secrecy on
the part of the defendant-CPA firm, because of the great threat of generating future
litigation by those hungry for dollars in settlement of nuisance claims.
7 See also The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
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audit examination is similar to the standard applied to doctors, law-
yers and other professional experts, in that their conduct is not
measured in terms of the customary "reasonable man" test of negli-
gence but rather in terms of a "reasonable CPA" test.' Why this fa-
vored treatment? Primarily, the fact that the services rendered by
these groups are considered to be highly skilled;9 there exist internal
codes of ethics and standards of performance established through
self-organization; 10 and the public's relative ignorance of the technical
ramifications involved in the performance of the complex services
rendered by these groups" create the need for a specialized standard
of care to be utilized by judge and jury in evaluating the conduct of
independent accountants,'12 doctors," engineers1 4 and lawyers." A
direct offshoot of the special negligence standard or "professional
measuring stick" is the problem of expert testimony and the related
ethical effects brought about by attempts at professional policing of
such testimony.' 6 The ethical overtones as well as the apparent lack
8Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So.
116 (1934); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364, 54 A.L.R.2d 316
(1955); Rassieur v. Charles, 354 Mo. 117, 188 S.W.2d 817 (1945). See generally Curran,
Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. REV. 535, 538-540 (1959);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 290F, comment e and § 299C, comment b.
9 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 8.
10 The tendency to self-regulate and establish codes of ethical conduct and uniform
standards of performance while determinative of "professional" status and hence relia-
bility for internal policing of the ranks may likewise serve as a device for dangerous
disregard of the public's interest. Some balance is obviously optimally desirable. See
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUm. L. REV. 1147, 1163-1167 (1942).
11 See James and Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials,
5 VAND. L. REV. 697, 710 (1952). Concern has been exhibited over leaving such tech-
nical matters to the jury at all. See Note, Accountant's Liability, 13 ST. JoHN's L. REV.
310, 323, 326 (1939).
12See Gammel v. Ernst, supra note 8; Smith v. London Assur. Corp., 109 App. Div.
882 96 N.Y.S. 820 (1905); Note, The Accountant's Liability-For What and to Whom,
36 IowA L. REV. 319 (1951).
13See REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT LAW 17, 29-30 (3d ed. 1956). See also McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 558-575 (1959), and
cases cited in note 55 therein.
14 See Cowles v. Minneapolis, 128 Minn. 452, 151 N.W. 184 (1915); Bell, Professional
Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 711 (1959).
15See Note, The Bases of the Attorney's Liability to His Client for Malpractice,
37 VA. L. REV. 429 (1951).
16 See Curran, supra note 8, at 545, where it is suggested that the widespread reluc-
tance to testify for plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits may represent a "conspiracy
of silence."
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of "professionalism" exhibited by recent CPA editorials and official
pronouncements urging fellow certified public accountants not to
testify "against" their colleagues will be considered later in this
study.17
Traditionally, absent special statutory provisions, there has been
no CPA liability for mere negligent conduct to third parties who were
not in some contractual relationship-privity of contract-with the
accountant at fault,'" with the possible exception of those instances
where the accountant knew in advance that the specific third party
was the one for whose primary benefit the statements audited by the
independent accountant were intended. 9 Third parties not in privity
have, however, been allowed recovery where the independent accoun-
tant has participated in an intentional fraud or has been so reckless as
to justify a finding of gross negligence (a concept not as yet ade-
quately defined by the courts) sufficient to satisfy by inference the
requisite intent necessary to constitute fraud. The special statutory
provisions alluded to above are enacted as an integral part of the fed-
eral securities regulations of the 1950's, which not only permit a suit
by a non-client lacking privity of contract on the basis of a false
statement or omission in the financial statements, but also shift the
burden of proof onto the defendant-accountant who must establish
his freedom from negligence or fraud along with the fact that such
negligence or fraud was not the proximate cause of the damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff.20 However, banks and similar credit lenders
apparently cannot as yet take advantage of these provisions and
bring an action thereunder,2' and the applicability of this federal
17 See notes 130 through 135 infra and the accompanying text. For the moment, let
it merely be noted that, as well recognized by Spacek (infra note 131), testimony is
not given "against" anyone but is proferred by a professional man as an expert witness
on the basis of facts and it is only upon these facts which he offers his expert testimony.
18 Early efforts of legal commentators concentrated on establishing the accountant's
contract with his employer as the basis for any duty to any party for negligent per-
formance of his audit examination and resulting misstatements. See Rouse, Legal Liability
of the Public Accountant, 23 Ky. L.J. 3 (1934).
19 Early focus on the contract resulted in a correlated brigade of arguments against
contributory negligence as a defense to such a non-tort action. See Comment, The Legal
Responsibility of Public Accountants, 35 YALE L. J. 76 (1925); Rouse, supra note 18.
20 These federal regulations are embodied in and have been promulgated under the
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881.
21 The Securities Acts apparently do not provide a remedy to such credit grantors.
See Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other Than His Employer for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 371, 383-388. However, with the recent broad inter-
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legislative remedy is likewise still apparently limited to special circum-
stances involving registration statements filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission as an incident to the offering of listed securities.
Thus, much of the potential third party causes of action fall outside
the sphere of coverage presently envisioned by the federal courts in
their interpretation of these statutes.
Recent litigation under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193422 has nevertheless witnessed a massive expansion of the
scope of CPA liability thereunder. In Green v. Childree,2" a federal
court held for the first time that certified public accountants whose
activities were confined to the preparation of false and misleading
financial statements and representations were not immunized from
civil suit brought by investors under Rule 10b-524 as a "participant"
in a sale of securities where the investor's purchase was induced by
such statements. With this holding as a foundation, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Fischer v.
Kletz,25 in denying the defendant CPA firm-Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co.'s 26 motion to dismiss claims based on Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, implied that:
(1) The element of a "gain" to the defendant, found so crucial in
prior Section 10(b) civil actions,27 was not necessary in cases
pretations of a "security" sanctioned by the courts, this exclusion of credit grantors
from the penumbra of Securities Act protections may be questionable today. See Coffey,
The Economic Realities of a 'Security': Is There A More Meaningful Formula? 18 WEST.
RES. L. REV. 367 (1967).
22 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1963).
23 Green v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
24 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1968) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national secruities exchange, (a) To employ any de-
vice, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
25 Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
26 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. were the auditors for Yale Express System, Inc.
For an interesting and penetrating analysis of the economic and financial background
of the Yale Express fiasco which eventually resulted in Fischer v. Kletz litigation, see
Whalen, The Big Skid at Yale Express, FORTUNE, November 1965, at 144.
27 See, e.g., Cochran v. Channing Corporation, 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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involving nondisclosure in a report required to be filed with
the SEC where the "unique" liability of accountants for non-
disclosure is at issue; 28 and
(2) Even though the relationship between the accountants and the
plaintiff-debenture-holders and shareholders is an important
circumstance, the lack of "privity," as that term has tradi-
tionally been defined in the law, does not necessitate the dis-
missal of a Section 10(b) action.2"
It is instructive to note the thinking of the court on the issues of
"intent" and "privity" for the purpose of comprehending its refusal
to dismiss the plaintiffs' common law tort cause of action founded on
the nondisclosure of after-acquired information as well as for some
"educated" speculation upon the future course of a "federal common
law" of accountants' liability to third parties. On the former point, the
district judge had this to say:
The imposition of the duty creates an objective standard against which to measure
a defendant's actions and leaves no room for an analysis of the subjective con-
siderations inherent in the area of intent. Thus, to base liability in part upon
subjective standards of intent of the nondisclosing defendant would blur and
weaken the objective basis of impact of nondisclosure upon the plaintiff. In the
alternative, if this rationale be deemed unacceptable, it can be persuasively urged
that in a nondisclosure case, intent can be sensibly imputed to a defendant who,
knowing that plaintiff will rely upon his original representations, sits by silently
when they turn out to be false. (Emphasis added)3°
The district judge responded to the defendant firm's privity argu-
ment with an excerpt from the opinion of Judge Lord in the recent
case of Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc. 1 "In my judgment, it
would be an unwarranted constriction of the broad protection con-
templated by the federal scheme of securities legislation to engraft
upon that scheme a requirement that is neither a part of the statute
nor a part of the governing common law tort principles." 2
28 Fischer v. Kletz, supra note 25, at 191; the court cites Fleischer, 'Federal Corpora-
tion Law': An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1156 (1965).
29 Fischer v. Kletz, supra note 25, at 192-93; See also Ruder, Civil Liability Under
Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 627 (1963);
19 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 387, 394 (1968), wherein it is concluded that Fischer
"suggests a significant extension of accountants' liability under both the common law
and the federal securities regulations."
30 Fischer v. Kletz, supra note 25, at 188.
31 Miller v. Bargain City, U. S. A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
32 Fischer v. Kletz, supra note 25, at 193.
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One might quite legitimately consider this summary dismissal of
the ancient prerequisite to negligence liability-"privity"-an analyt-
ical shame. Perhaps, this is one of the sacrifices associated with the
"nationalization" of an entire body of legal liability principles under
the guise of a predominant federal interest. 33
Before we can intelligently consider the possible and probable
changes in the common law of accountants' liability to third parties
which we may expect to observe or encounter in the very near future
in light of these federal securities cases, emerging tort law concepts
and current socio-economic conditions, a new look at the traditional
concepts of the CPA's liability to third parties is essential. This re-
examination will proceed, at first, primarily through a "revisitation"
to the Ultramares decision, which still stands as the keystone for the
entire area of accountants' legal liability to third parties.
The earliest decision directly concerned with a certified public ac-
countant's liability to a third party not in privity in the United States
was Landell v. Lybrand, 4 decided in 1919. The defendant-CPAs au-
dited the books and accounts of the Employers' Indemnity Company
for the year 1911. The plaintiff, having been shown the defendant's
report by someone touting that company's stock, averred that he had
been induced to buy eleven shares of the capital stock of the company,
at the price of $200 per share, on the strength of Lybrand's report as
to its client's assets and liabilities at the close of the business year
1911. A further contention was that the report was false and untrue
and that the stock purchased on the strength of the report was value-
83 Kessler, Court Decision Prods Prospectus Preparers to Check Facts Better, The Wall
Street Journal, May 14, 1968, at 1, col. 6, commented upon the opinion of Federal
District Judge Edward C. McLean in his March 29 decision in Escott v. Bar-Chris
Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where it was held that under-
writers, lawyers, auditors and directors all were blameworthy for false financial informa-
tion contained in a prospectus. Kessler comments upon this landmark decision as
follows: "The decision is likely to mean that everyone connected with a registration
will be much more meticulous than in the past. . . . In theory, it means that nearly
everyone involved must check every material fact himself by plodding through com-
pany records." Kessler also points out that: "He (Judge McLean) also ruled that the
accountants in the Bar-Chris case were liable for the portions of the prospectus they
had worked on because they had failed to show due diligence. He ruled that they had
never ascertained whether there had been important changes in the company's financial
situation in the months after their audit but before the registration. There had been
an important change, the judge said." This type of loose decision may well represent
the vogue of the near future-underwriters and corporate lawyers, as well as accountants,
beware 1
84 Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919).
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less. Based upon these allegations, the plaintiff-stockholder's cause of
action was framed in terms of "trespass for negligence." The defen-
dant CPA firm demurred on the ground that the stockholder's state-
ment of his claim failed to disclose a meritorious cause of action.
Hence, the court, procedurally taking as true the averments by the
stockholder, was for the first time confronted with a "pure" question
of legal theory: Is a CPA liable for negligence to a stockholder who
relied on the accountant's false and untrue financial report? The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court weakly responded, holding Lybrand not
liable because "the plaintiff was a stranger to the defendants and
their report, and, as no duty rested upon them to him, they cannot
be guilty of any negligence of which he can complain.""5 Unfortunately,
the court did not enter into any discussion concerning the peculiar
nature of the services performed by accountants or whether it is rea-
sonable to forsee that stockholders or potential investors might rely
on their certified financial reports. Rather, all that the Pennsylvania
court did was to utter the above statement concerning absence of
duty and cite a quite inapplicable case,8 wherein the same court had
decided that a job applicant could not recover damages for injuries
suffered when visiting his potential employer's premises as a result of
faulty construction and repair of those premises by a building con-
tractor because the job applicant was a "mere licensee, ' 87 and, hence,
was owed no duty of care. A commentator at the time criticized
Landell stating that both "its justice and expediency are question-
able.""8
Judicial pronouncements such as Landell v. Lybrand have gone a
long way toward clouding the law of accountants' liability as have
8 5 Id. at 408.
86 Schiffer v. Sauer Co., 238 Pa. 550, 85 A. 479 (1913).
87 Id. at 554. See also James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to
Licensees and Invitees, 63 YAiZ L. J. 605 (1954).
8829 YALE L. J. 234 (1919), wherein it is concluded: "[Ain attorney cannot reason-
ably be expected to forsee [sic] that strangers will probably act on his advice, for
experience shows otherwise. And this reasoning seems to apply also to cases of physi-
cians, because a doctor prescribes for a particular patient and does not intend, nor
is it reasonably probable, that third parties will rely and act upon his advice to this
particular patient. But neither of these classes of cases conflicts with the proposition
that public accountants should be held liable to third parties for negligence, when it is
reasonably foreseeable that third parties may act upon their audits. And if the courts
will not impose this duty to [sic] the public, then it is submitted that this is a case for
legislative enactment."
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the blind reliances, by legal commentators39 and jurists in subsequent
cases, on the Landell holding without thoroughly considering the lim-
ited thought process and underlying precedential basis used by the
Pennsylvania court in that early case.
This brings us to the famous case of Ultramares v. Touche.4 ° In
Ultramares, Judge Cardozo attempted to summarize, clarify, and ex-
pound for continuing future guidance the law of accountants' liability.
Due to the recent flood of litigation4' involving third party efforts to
recoup financial losses from certifying independent accountants, mod-
ern developments in the nature, scope and uniform character of the
audit services rendered by the organized practice of public account-
ing," the apparent poor public image of the CPA-public misinforma-
tion about what he does and the responsibility he assumes, and public
attitude favoring expansion of CPA legal liability, and emerging legal
concepts in other areas of tort law and in the rapidly expanding field
of federal securities regulation, Judge Cardozo's Ultramares opinion
needs to be reviewed and critically analyzed once again at this crucial
time, even though this task has been undertaken many times.4 3 It
must be noted, however, that most such efforts were put forth in the
late thirties and early forties by innumerable scholars, not a small
number of whom were overly-enamored with Cardozian logic44 and
might have been a bit biased in their analyses.
Ultramares was a tort action initiated against Touche, Niven & Co.,
a national firm of certified public accountants, for damages suffered
through the misrepresentations made by the accountants in connection
with their examination of, and report on, the financial records of Fred
Stern & Co. as of December 31, 1923. The plaintiff presented its case
39 See, e.g., MacMillan, Sources and Extent of Liability of a Public Accountant, 15
CHI-KENT REV. 1 (1936). Although quite dull and written in a summary fashion,
it presents a survey of cases prior to and including Ultramares.
40 Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
41 See, e.g., supra notes 2, 4; Heinemann, supra note 1; The Wall Street Journal, Nov.
15, 1966, at 1, col. 6; supra note 5.
42 See Broad, The Progress of Auditing, 101 J. Accy. (No. 5, Nov. 1955) 38-43.
43 Examples of these analyses are Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts,
48 YALE L. J. 390, at 412-422 (1939); Harper and MeNeely, A Synthesis of the Law
of Misrepresentation, 22 MINN. L. REV. 939 (1938); Rouse, supra note 18; Keeton,
The Ambit of a Fraudulent Representor's Responsibility, 17 TEXAs L. REV. 1 (1938);
Mac Millan, supra note 39; Meek, supra note 21.
4 4 See, e.g., Seavey, supra note 43 ; Harper and McNeely, supra note 43.
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on the basis of two theories, the first cause of action in its complaint
founded on misrepresentations that were merely negligent and the
second keyed to misrepresentations alleged to have been fraudulent.
Judge Cardozo wrote for a unanimous New York Court of Appeals
and permitted recovery on the theory of actionable fraud but denied
any right of recovery based on the theory of negligence, in the absence
of privity, stating that to allow such recovery would so expand the
field of liability for negligent speech as to "make it merely, if not quite,
coterminous with that of liability for fraud. '45 In Cardozo's words,
"If liability for negligence exists [to third parties], a thoughtless slip
or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forging beneath the cover
of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an in-
determinate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class."
46
It is extremely interesting to compare the words of Judge Cardozo
quoted above from Ultramares with his thoughts as expressed in his
1916 decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,47 which involved a
claim, also in tort, by the purchaser of a defectively manufactured
automobile who was injured as a result of its conditions against the
manufacturer of the automobile. In such cases, traditionally the
purchaser's sole cause of action was on his contract of purchase
against the retail dealer from whom he had bought the automobile,
and, due to the absence of privity of contract, no cause of action for
negligence would lie against the manufacturer. The "grand-daddy"
English case requiring such privity was Winterbottom v. Wright48
which involved a suit by the driver of a mail coach against the sup-
plier of the coach who had made the coach available pursuant to a
contract with the postmaster. The driver, an employee of that post-
master, was injured when the coach broke down due to a latent and
negligent defect. Recovery was denied because the driver and the
supplier were not "in privity." Notice what Lord Abinger had to say
in his opinion in Winterbottom v. Wright:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can
sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured
4 5 Supra note 40, at 185, 174 N.E. at 446-47.
46 Supra note 40, at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
47 Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
48 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109 (Exch. 1842).
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by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine
the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them,
the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would
ensue.
49
Do these words of Lord Abinger not sound similar to those of Judge
Cardozo in Ultramares?
In MacPherson, Judge Cardozo rejected the rationale of Winterbot-
tom v. Wright and allowed the purchaser of the defective automobile
to recover, concluding:
The contractor who builds a scaffold invites the owner's workmen to use it. The
manufacturer who sells the automobile to the retail dealer invites the dealer's
customers to use it. The invitation is addressed in the one case to determinate
persons and in the other to an indeterminate class, but in each case it is equally
plain, and in each case its consequences must be the same (liability for negligence,
regardless of the lack of privity). There is nothing anomalous in a rule which
imposes upon A, who has contracted with B, a duty to C and D and others
according as he knows that the subject-matter of the contract is intended for
their use. 50
In the writer's opinion, these words do not jibe with Judge Cardozo's
own words in Ultramares where he expressed the fear of exposing ac-
countants to a liability to an indeterminate class." In other words,
Judge Cardozo held that the identity of future automobile purchasers
need not be forseeable to Buick before Buick can be held liable for
its own negligent conduct, even though the beneficiaries of this duty
of care are ultimate consumers-"an indeterminate class who, in the
nature of things, will eventually use or come in contact with the pro-
ducts in question." Likewise, it logically follows that Judge Cordozo
in Ultramares should have held that the identity of future users of the
financial statements and reports prepared by accountants need not be
foreseeable to those accountants as a precondition to the imposition of
liability for their own negligent conduct. He might have said in Ultra-
mares:
After all, since the accountant knows that his report and certified financial state-
ments are normally included as part and parcel of his client's annual report to
stockholders, creditors, potential investors and financial analysts, this class of
ultimate readers of his report and statements is certainly forseeable to him even
though the identity of the specific members of this class is not known to him.
Hence, these users of financial statements are beneficiaries of a duty of care
4 9 Id. at 114.
50 Mac Pherson, supra note 46, at 393.
51 See supra note 40, at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
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owed to them by the accountant; and, if he should be negligent, he must, in
fairness and right, compensate those who have been injured by his wrongful
act or conduct. 52
What factors, then, forced Judge Cardozo to make the apparent
turnabout in Ultramares? Our answer may rest in a more detailed
analysis of the Ultramares decision. Touche, Niven had been em-
ployed by Fred Stern & Co. at the end of each of the three years
preceding 1923 to render a similar service in the certification and prep-
aration of a balance sheet exhibiting the financial condition of the
company. Stern's operations demanded extensive credit and the com-
pany had borrowed huge sums of money from banks and other
lenders, and this information was well known to Touche, Niven. The
CPA firm was also aware of the fact that in the usual course of business
its client would circulate the certified balance sheet among banks, other
credit lenders, stockholders, customers or suppliers "according to the
needs of the occasion, as the basis of financial dealings."5 Conse-
quently, when the balance sheet was prepared, the defendant firm of
certified public accountants provided its client with thirty-two copies
certified with serial numbers as counterpart originals. 54 Ultramares
Corporation was a factor in New York and was approached by Stern &
Co. with a request for loans of funds sufficient to finance its sales of
rubber in March, 1924, and, as a precondition to its receipt of any
loans, Stern was required to present the factor with a certified bal-
ance sheet. Conforming to Ultramares' request, Stern transferred to
the factor one of the certificates signed by Touche, Niven attesting to
the correctness of the balance sheet and the solvent equity position in
excess of $1 million disclosed therein as of December 31, 1923. 55 In
52 Such a forthright statement would have abandoned privity just as the California
Supreme Court repudiated that doctrine in the case of a notary improperly acting as
an attorney who was held liable to the intended beneficiary of a will drafted by the
notary, but defectively executed due to his negligence. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d
647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). See Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND.
L. R v. 755, 759 (1959).
53 Supra note 40, at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
54 Surely the number of copies of the certified balance sheets supplied by Touche
must not be ignored in resolving the quagmire of "primary benefit." Carefully examine
and compare the language of the district court in Fischer v. Kletz, supra note 25, high-
lighted in the text, supra note 30.
55 The balance sheet showed assets of $2,550,671.88, liabilities of $1,479,956.62, and
a resulting stockholders' equity position of $1,070,715.26. Supra note 40, at 174, 175,
174 N.E. at 442.
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reality, Stern & Co. was insolvent and the books had been falsified
by the management of Stern so as to set forth accounts receivable and
certain other assets which turned out to be fictitious.
On the faith of the certificate, Ultramares made its initial loan to
Stern which was followed by many others."6 In light of the insolvent
financial position of Stern & Co., it is no surprise that the loans went
bad and that the rubber company was declared a bankrupt on
January 2, 1925. At this point Ultramares understandably sought to
salvage some measures of recovery for its imprudent extension of
credit by instituting the suit against Touche, Niven for damages
suffered in reliance on the latter's audit examination which was al-
legedly performed in a negligent and/or fraudulent manner. Judge
Cardozo found (and there can be little doubt that he was correct in
this respect) that the performance of the audit by Touche, Niven and
its employees was clearly negligent.57 For example, in the areas of ac-
counts receivable and inventory, even a modicum of reasonable caution
and diligence would have revealed substantial falsifications of invoices,
inflations of inventory, nondisclosure of pledged accounts and other
irregularities that existed. This certainly was not one of those instances
where, as boldly and critically asserted in a recent Journal of Accoun-
tancy editorial, "a jury, in light of hindsight, inferred that if fi-
nancial statements turn out to be wrong, the auditor should have found
the errors."58
Professor Green59 long ago viewed Ultramares as a desirable judicial
pronouncement because it gives the judge and jury more of an equal-
ized power as a result of the psychological effects upon the jury of a
fraud formula which is more sobering than a negligence formula re-
quiring less moral culpability.6" This may be a practical expedient
from the standpoint of the administration of the judicial process at
the trial level, but when viewed in light of its effect upon the rights of
56 The reliance issue was, strangely enough, not controverted. Judge Cardozo merely
stated, supra note 40, at 175, 174 N.E. at 443: "On the faith of that certificate the
plaintiff made a loan which was followed by many others." (Emphasis added) In the
case of a public investor, however, this issue may be the subject of great controversy.
Examine the authorities cited, supra note 29.
57 Supra note 40, at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
58 Supra note 2, at 33.
59 Note, The Judicial Process-Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 26 ILL. L. REV. 49 (1931).
6 0 Id. at 55.
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specific parties litigant, the thrust of such a concept is jurisprudentially
brazen and repulsive. A contemporary of Professor Green has criti-
cized his attitude as expressed above, 61 noting that the alternative in
Ultramares was not the abandonment of the fraud theory, but rather,
that it should not preclude the negligence theory. 2
The real problem facing Judge Cardozo was whether the negligent
conduct, even though it clearly existed, was a wrong to the particular
plaintiff: Did the accounting firm owe to Ultramares Corporation a
duty of care not to be negligent? Judge Cardozo first set forth the
long-established rule that "the defendants owed to the creditors and
investors, to whom their client exhibited the certificate, a duty to
make their certificate and audit without fraud,' 63 because "there was
notice in the circumstances of its making that the client (employer)
did not intend to keep it to himself."64
After discussing the many avenues down which the assault upon
"the citadel of privity" had proceeded up until 1931, many of those
great inroads having been established by Cardozo himself,6" he stated
that the service rendered by Touche, Niven was primarily for the
benefit of the Stern Company,66 "a convenient instrumentality for
use in the development of the business,"67 and only incidentally or col-
laterally for the use of those third parties who might later have the
certified report presented to them by officials of Stern.61 "Foresight of
these possibilities," he opined, "may charge with liability for fraud but
the conclusion does not follow that it will charge with liability for
negligence."69
61 Shampaine, Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence and Deceit,
17 ST. Louis L. REV. 248 (1932).
62 Id. at 256.
63 Supra note 40, at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
64 See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REV.
733 (1929).
65 E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 47; Glanzer v. Shepard, 233
N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); International Products Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331,
155 N.E. 662 (1927); Doyle v Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E.
574 (1930). See Prosser, Assault on the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
66 Supra note 40, at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
67 ld.
68 Id. Reexamine Bohlen, supra note 64.
69 Supra note 40, at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
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Judge Cardozo next suggested that if the assault on privity be
broadened so that accountants' liability for negligence be recognized,
such an extension "is a question of policy and, if made, would so ex-
pand the field of negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite,
coterminous with liability for fraud. '70 This critical assertion is, in
this observer's opinion, based on a serious false premise on the part
of Judge Cardozo. He seems to have confused mere negligence with
negligence "so gross as to warrant an inference of fraud" and equated
one with the other in this area of accountants' liability. Perhaps, what
led Judge Cardozo to believe that extending liability for negligence to
accountants would equate this legal responsibility with liability for
fraud was a lack of basic understanding about the nature of an audit
examination, generally accepted internal standards of audit perfor-
mance, and uniform auditing procedures. It must be emphasized, in
fairness to Judge Cardozo, that at the time of his Ultramares decision,
uniform professional audit standards and recognized internal auditing
procedures and detailed practices were not as well developed as they
presently are.71 Nevertheless, it certainly appears that there are some
errors made by accountants which would be actionable only on the
theory of fraud, and others on the theory of mere negligence, and a
third group which might overlap both areas of potential liability.
For example, where the accountant is in collusion with management
and intentionally misrepresents the financial condition of the enter-
prise under review for the purpose of misleading the third party(ies),
such conduct definitely seems actionable as fraud. Additionally, a
"dichotomy of errors" may be established taking cognizance of the
nature of an audit examination and the underlying professional stan-
dards72 prevalent in the performance of such audits, which define,
both in a general manner and with specific utility, the scope of (1)
mere negligence and (2) negligence so gross as to warrant an inference
70 Supra note 40, at 185, 174 N.E. at 447. But cf. the passage from Shampaine, supra
notes 61, 62, demonstrating that such equalization was not the analytical consequence
of recognizing liability for negligence.
71See Broad, supra note 42, at 38-43; Solomon, A List oj Audit Techniques, 26 ILL.
CPA (Summer 1964) 38. The present state of refined audit standards and procedures is
due in large part to the McKesson & Robbins fiasco of the 1930's and its sad aftermath
resulting from the failure to discover almost $20 million of phony current assets. See
In the Mater of McKesson & Robbins, SEC Acctg. Series, Release No. 19 (1940).
72 See AICPA, Committee on Auditing Procedure, GENERALLY ACCEPTED AUmno
STANDARDS-THEIR SIGNIFICANCE AND SCOPE (1954); AICPA, Committee on Auditing
Procedure, STATEMENTS ON AUDITING PROCEDURE No. 33 (1963).
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of fraud. As an illustration of how this "natural" dichotomy would
operate, it is submitted that gross negligence could effectively en-
compass the failure to comply with, and total disregard for, the self-
promulgated generally accepted audit standards,73 required audit pro-
cedures 7 4 or the specific mandates of the rules of ethical conduct 75
formulated by the American Institute of CPAs, while mere negligence
could be restricted to those instances where there has been some
bona fide attempt at compliance with professional standards, gen-
erally accepted procedures and rules of ethics but carelessness in their
application has resulted in a misrepresentation in the financial state-
ments and a consequential falsification in the audit report.76 The writer
does not envision, nor desire, wholesale subjugation of independent
accountants to unlimited liability for every mistake that happens to
get printed in a financial statement. Rather, it is hoped that an honest
recognition of liability for negligence along with judicial reliance on
self-promulgated standards and rules of audit practice and the main-
tenance of strict standards of proof to establish a basis for recovery
will, in the long run, act to improve the quality of CPA performance
and reduce the quantity of litigation directed against the accounting
profession in this country.
In essence, Judge Cardozo's fear of coterminating liability for fraud
with liability for "negligent speech" on the part of accountants was
neither correct nor justified. Many cases have recognized the distinc-
tion between the reckless misrepresentation essential to an action for
fraud and the negligent misrepresentation that may be actionable
apart from any allegation of fraud, in areas of tort law other than ac-
countants' liability."
The historical basis for the imposition of liability for the use of
speech in a reckless manner, absent a fraudulent intent on the part
of the speaker, seems to have been quite well formulated by Jeremiah
Smith in 1900.78 He observed:
73 Id.
74 STATEMENTS ON AUDITING PROCEDURE No. 33, supra note 72. See also SEC Acctg.
Series, Release No. 21 at 38 (1956); and Solomon, supra note 71, at 38-39.
75AICPA, BY LAws-CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 28-33 (1964). See also CAREY,
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF CPAs (1956).
76See Meek, supra note 21; Note, The Accountant's Liability, supra note 12; and
Shampaine, supra note 61, at 256.
77 Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N.Y. 375, 118 N.E. 855 (1918); Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co.
v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 1, 159 N.E. 700 (1928).
78 Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARv. L. Rzv. 184 (1900).
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An action for misstatement should be allowed when these requisites are present:-
1. Defendant volunteered a statement to the plaintiff. . . . 2. The statement was not
true in fact. 3. Defendant, though believing the statement, had no reasonable
grounds for such belief .... 4. Defendant made the statement with the intention
that plaintiff should act upon it. 5. The subject-matter of the statement was
such that one who acted in reliance upon it would be likely to incur substantial
pecuniary loss in case the statement proved incorrect . . . . 6. Plaintiff acted in
reliance upon the statement and such action and reliance on his part was reason-
able .... 7. Plaintiff was damaged by so acting.
7 9
One must quite clumsily exert his manipulative powers in order to
fit the negligent certified public accountant misstatement outside this
framework.8 ° Likewise, the awkward nature of the Ultramares differ-
entiation between fraud, negligence and negligence so gross as to create
an inference of fraud, along with the inappropriateness of forcing in-
terested parties to grapple with this unnecessary and illogical inter-
mingling of fraud with negligence, are aptly illustrated by the simpli-
fied legal theory of liability for negligent speech outlined by Jeremiah
Smith81 and the correlated difficulties of struggling to fit the Ultramares
trichotomy within its bounds.
In addition, the possibility, quite conceivable to this observer, def-
initely exists that since Judge Cardozo had in Ultramares an "open and
shut" case of gross negligence (i.e., failure to trace to supporting in-
voices in any manner whatsoever and accounts receivable in excess of
$700,000 not entered on the books) and scienter (i.e., the accountants
made a statement as true to their knowledge when they had no such
knowledge on the subject), he was much freer in his defense of the
citadel of privity in the area of accountants' liability for negligence
than he otherwise would have been had there not existed the means
for permitting recovery on the alternate theory of fraud. This goes
a long way toward explaining Judge Cardozo's apparent inconsistent
turnabout in Ultramares with his earlier expressions, especially in
MacPherson v. Buick, that:
(1) "The manufacturer who sells the automobile to the retail dealer
invites the dealer's customers to use it" and even though the
79 Id. at 195-96.
80 See also Davis v. Nuzum, 72 Wis. 439, 40 N.W. 497 (1888); Griswold v. Gebbie,
126 Pa. 353, 17 A. 673 (1889).
81 See text, supra note 79.
82 Ultramares, supra note 40, at 190, 191-92; see SIGAUD, ACCOUNTANTS' LEGAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY COURSE MANUAL AND DiscussioN GumE at 116-17 (1956).
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customers are an indeterminate class the manufacturer is
plainly liable for negligence, regardless of the lack of privity; 3
and
(2) "There is nothing anomalous in a rule which imposes upon A,
who has contracted with B, a duty to C and D and others ac-
cording as he knows" or does not know "that the subject-mat-
ter of the contract is intended for their use." 4
Two final "Cardozian platitudes" set forth in Ultramares loom
large, remain uncontroverted, and appear to not be completely correct
when examined more closely-Cardozo held that:
(1) "The service rendered [by Touche, Niven & Co.] was pri-
marily for the benefit of the Stern Company a convenient in-
strumentality for use in the development of the business, and
only incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom
Stern might exhibit it thereafter."8 r5
(2) "[P]ublic accountants are public only in the sense that their
services are offered to any one who chooses to employ them,"
not "in the sense that the services are rendered in the pursuit
of an independent calling, characterized public, giving rise to
the duty to speak with care [to the public] . . . .This is far
from saying that those who do not employ them are in the
same position as those who do."' s6
Let us first consider Judge Cardozo's assertion to the effect that
the certified public accountant's services are rendered primarily for
the benefit of his client. Of course, the client is going to be financially
benefited thereby since he can more readily obtain credit and en-
courage potential investors to part with their funds. But if we consider
the term benefit as intended to mean use (as that term should be in-
terpreted when considered in light of its employment by Cardozo
himself), creditors, stockholders, potential investors and suppliers in
83 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 47, at 393, 111 N.E. at 1054.
84 Id. The English courts had apparently taken the same step earlier and repudiated
Winterbottom v. Wright, supra note 48. See White v. Steadman, 3 K.B. 340, 348 [1913].
85 Supra note 40, at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
8 6 Supra note 40, at 188, 174 N.E. at 448, wherein Cardozo pointed to lawyers who
opine as to the validity of publicly issued municipal bonds, and title companies insuring
titles to parcels of land to be sold, as potential additional victims, if liability to the
public were to be sanctioned as against the independent accountants.
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our modern credit-oriented economy not only use, but many require
and create the very need for, the independent CPA's report and cer-
tificate concerning the results of his audit examination of the client's
books and financial records, balance sheet, income position, and other
accounting, financial and related schedules, exhibits or comments. In
fact, to say that the primary utility derived from the independent ac-
countant's report and statements rests with third parties, such as sup-
pliers, credit lenders, potential and present investors, and financial
analysts is certainly no great overstatement. 7 Obviously, the CPA is
aware of this use of his certificates and reports by "the public" and
takes this factor into consideration in billing the client for the ser-
vices rendered in conjunction with his audit examination."8 As direct
evidence in support of this assertion is the fact that Touche, Niven &
Co. (even in its 1923 audit of the records of Fred Stern & Co.) supplied
Stern's management with thirty-two copies of their certified report.8"
Judge Cardozo was, therefore, amiss in contending that the services
rendered by the accountants were only incidentally for the use of those
third parties to whom its client's management might subsequently ex-
hibit the certified statement and report." A commentator of Ultramares
has viewed "privity" as a determinant of the "real parties in in-
terest."910ne wonders whether such a legitimate reading of the privity
limitation in light of the CPA's cognizance of third party use does not
itself compel the recognition of CPA liability for negligence to inves-
tors and credit grantors as "the real parties in interest.""
Regarding Judge Cardozo's statement that public accountants are
public only in the sense that their services are offered to any member
87 Judge Cardozo is not totally blameworthy. The poor public image and under-
standing of the CPA and his attest function have contributed greatly to the confusion
(judicial and public) about the "primary benefit" of his certification and audit report.
See Heinemann, supra note 1. These problems are further intertwined with and com-
pounded by the failure of accountants to develop uniform principles and postulates.
See Lerner and Solomon, Accounting and Law Intertwined: A Case Study oj the Need
for Uniform Accounting Principles, 56 GEORGETOWN L.J. 670 (1968).
88 No small part of the blame for poor public understanding of the CPA's role as
an auditor and his related financial responsibility to the public rests on the shoulders
of the accounting community itself. See Broad, supra note 42, at 38-43.
8 9 See supra note 54.
90 See Broad, supra note 42; Hanson, Responsibilities of Independent Public Account-
ants, 22 Bus. LwYR. 975 (1967).
91 Note, Scope of Liability of a Negligent Report, 8 TEM. L. Q. 404, 410 (1934).
92 See Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 254, 25 So. 678, 688 (1899).
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of the general public, the editors of the Accountant's Handbook state
that the two most important features of the public accountant's work
are "the expert nature of the assignments which he undertakes and
the independence with which he carries them out."" They offer in dis-
cussion of the second essential element the following excerpt from a
leading authority on CPA independence:
Clearly there would be no great store by the certified public accountant's opinion
or certificate if the users of published reports were not confident of his inde-
pendence of judgment as well as his technical competence . . . .The basic dif-
ference between privately employed accountants and professional practitioners is
in their responsibilities, moral or legal, to the corporation or the public, and in
the extent to which their relationship may tend to influence their judgment. In
the last analysis, therefore, it is his independence which is the certified public
accountant's economic excuse for existence.9 4
Unless the truth of these observations has dissipated to falsity since
1946 when they were originally expressed (and it is much more likely
that they are even more correct in light of the modern development
of our United States credit-oriented economy 5 and growth of the
organized practice of public accounting since World War II), 96 public
accountants are predominantly public in the sense that their services
are rendered in the pursuit of an independent calling. It appears that
Judge Cardozo in Ultramares severely erred in prima facie dismissing
the question of whether any corresponding duty arises to speak with
care on the part of these public servants pursuing an independent cal-
ling and thereby safeguarding the public's interest, in that he did not
consider the true cornerstone of the accounting profession, its "eco-
nomic excuse for existence," ' independence. In effect, Judge Cardozo
gave the public accountants more of a special favor than even they,
themselves, claim to deserve by his misconstruction of the term
"public.""'
The post-Ultramares accountants' liability decisions in the United
States and England have not really departed from the basic precepts
93 WIXON AND KELL, AccOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK (4th ed. 1962).
94 CAREy, supra note 75.
95 Sec Heinemann, supra note 1; The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
98 Broad, supra note 42; and Hanson, supra note 90.
97 Supra note 94.
98 Supra note 93.
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laid down so definitively by Judge Cardozo in Ultramares.9 Because of
this and so as not to detract from our complete study of the keystone
Ultramares formulations, a brief analytical summary of these later
cases apears as Appendix A at the conclusion of this study.
A playful analytical exercise seems most appropriate at this time to
even further illustrate the doctrinal "strain" in Ultramares as a mon-
umental tort law pronouncement. This "five-finger" exercise will first
entail the allocation of one case to each "finger."
(1) The MacPherson v. Buick type of case where the consumer,
injured as a result of a defectively manufactured product,
seeks to recover damages for resulting injuries from the man-
ufacturer.
(2) Landlord liability situations where L leases a "tumbledown"
building to be used by the lessee at once as a place of public
entertainment, L being aware that the premises are to be
thrown open to the general public.
(3) The case in which a mother, standing across the street from
her young child, observes the child being struck and killed by
an automobile operated in a negligent manner by D driver
and suffers severe emotional injury and mental anguish, seeking
to recover compensation for her injuries from the driver.
(4) The Mock Co.' "waterworks" type of case where a private
taker of water from the municipality suffers fire damage to
his property as a result of the water company's failure to
furnish adequate water and pressure to extinguish the fire
pursuant to its contract with the city.
(5) The Ultramares-type situation with a slight variation where
the CPA audits the books and records of C Company and ren-
ders an opinion on its financial statements knowing that his
published opinion and certificate will be exhibited along with
the financial statements to credit lenders and stockholders as
part and parcel of C Company's annual report. The CPA has
been careless in his examination although acting in a good
faith effort at compliance with accepted standards of field work
and investigation, resulting in a substantial overstatement of
99 See LEVY, ACCOUNTANTS' LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 19-24, 131-46, 194 et seq. (1954).
100 Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
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C Company's net income and a severely distorted balance sheet.
A relying shareholder who otherwise would have sold his stock
but for reliance on the CPA's opinion accompanying the fa-
vorable financial statements seeks to recoup his losses from
the CPA when C Company is found soon afterward to be in-
solvent.
The playful exercise becomes one of determining whether all five
"fingers" can properly be part of the same "hand," that hand being
a unified theory of tort liability, even though the traditional results
seem inconsistent.
As we have already seen, liability clearly exists in Case 1, and the
absence of privity is immaterial since the automobile dealer is treated
as a mere "conduit" or "funnel" passing the manufacturer's danger-
ous auto through to the ultimate consumer, which passage was plainly
foreseeable to the manufacturer. 1° 1
In the Case 2 situations, the landlord has consistently been held
liable to persons other than the lessee who have suffered injury as a
result of the defective premises even though there is no "privity" be-
tween the members of the public and the landlord and even though
there is another party on whom the risk of loss could have been passed
off (the lessee). 102 The theory supporting recovery from the land-
lord in such cases has been that injury to members of the public other
than the lessee is to be forseen by the landlord and, in turn, this for-
seeability of risk "imposes a duty of care" on the landlord.10 3
The scale of liability then moves traditionally to nonrecovery in
Cases 3, 4 and 5. In Case 3, the mother standing on the sidewalk has
consistently been denied recovery for her emotional injuries. 04 How-
101 Supra note 50.
10 2 See Junkermann v. Tilyou R. Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915), and cases cited
therein. It is interesting to note that in Cardozo's assault upon privity in MacPherson,
the landlord's duty in these "tumbledown" leasing situations was instrumental in
providing precedential authority for developing the theory of auto manufacturer's
liability.
103 See 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 167, (1966); Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability
for Disrepair, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 467 (1936), a general discussion of landlord responsi-
bility predicated upon forseeability as well as certain other bases, including "nuisance",
not material here.
104 See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) ; Waube v.
Washington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935), which denied recovery on the basis of
lack of "proximate cause," utilizing the limitation logic of Palsgraj v. Long Island R.
Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (which incidentally was also formulated by
Judge Cardozo) ; See also HARPER AND JAMES, 2 TORTS 1035 (1956).
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ever, if she were placed "in danger" (i.e., walking across the street
with the child) yet escaped physical injury herself, recovery would
normally be allowed the mother for her emotional anguish and mental
harm. 105 One might seriously question the logic of this distinction, yet
a handy "rule of thumb" is provided. Perhaps the distinction is an
outgrowth of the "common law conservatism" that there must be some
limit to the harms for which the legal system will force the negligent
actor to pay. Suppose the mother is at home and does not see the
accident, but a neighbor rushes in and tells her of the tragedy? If it
is thought that recovery should not be allowed the mother under such
circumstances, it would create a severe strain on theory to permit
recovery where the mother fortuitously happened to see the accident
with her own eyes while standing across the street.'0 6 Even more haz-
ardous from a logical standpoint, is the extension of liablity a rational
incident where the "remoteness" is minimized just because the mother
accompanied her child across the intersection and was herself in
danger of being hit? What is revealed by the above sequence, neverthe-
less, is the common law reaction that there must be some limit on
potential liability for tortious conduct. Of additional significance, in
this writer's opinion, is the fact that emotional injuries of friends and
relatives of the victim is the type of variable which cannot be in-
sured against on any sensible rate scale or coverage plan by automo-
bile drivers.' This factor tends even more toward maintaining some
cut-off point, but, in turn, apparently upsets the theoretical scheme
of uniform liability for conceptually similar tortious conduct.
The Case 4 "waterworks" situation has generally gone in favor of
1 0 5See Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1 K.B. 141 (CA 1925). Examine the theory of
recovery espoused by the Maryland court in Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165
A. 182 (1933).
106 Goodhart, Emotional Shock and the Unimaginative Taxicab Driver, 69 L. Q. REv.
347, 352 (1963), notes the logical strain of a sliding scale of remoteness in terms of the
length of time consumed by the taxicab in backing into the child crossing the street.
The same difficulty arises when remoteness is measured in terms of the mother's dis-
tance from the place of impact. See generally Green, Fright Cases, 27 ILL. L. REv. 761
(1933); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REv. 1033 (1936). It should be remembered that this same Professor Green found
the result in Ultramares quite appealing for its effect upon the judge-jury function
in the judicial process-consider his attitude in these "fright cases" alongside his Ultra-
mares attitude.
107 Compare this non-insurability with the contrasting situation presented by ac-
countants' liability. But notice the effect upon insurance coverage and rates which has
resulted from the recent rush to the courthouse.
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the water utility companies primarily based on the "absence of privity"
rationale, at times reinforced by the distasteful "nonfeasance-misfea-
sance" distinction."' 8 Like the Case 3 common law gut reaction or
"sensual desire" to set some practicable limit, the "privity" limita-
tion in the waterworks cases really boils down to a policy judgment to
the effect that it is advisable to protect water companies from the
"indeterminate" liability which might arise from the destruction by
fire of a large portion of the city or town due to lack of water pres-
sure. 0 9 However, the likelihood that the water company can, and
most likely does, pass this risk off to the city in the form of higher
rates cannot be neglected and certainly cuts the other way-toward
imposition of liability. Also, of great significance is the glaring fact
that the leading waterworks cases were decided at a time"10 when the
"nonfeasance" and "absence of privity" limitations were sufficient in
correlated areas of tort law to prevent recovery ipso facto.
The variation of the Ultramares problem, Case 5, is much like
each of the other four situations in certain respects. It appears to the
writer that the factual and circumstantial position of the CPA is
most similar to that of the landlord in Case 2. As is true of the land-
lord and the defective leased premises, the CPA has advance knowl-
edge that his statements and report will be relied upon by certain
segments of the public and their harm from reliance should the CPA
be careless in his audit examination is certainly forseeable to him.
The exact identities of the members of the public who will enter the
"tumbledown" building are no more known to the landlord than are
the specific identities of the users of the CPA's statements and report.
Even so, while the landlord has long been held liable to the injured
public, the negligent CPA is protected by the Ultramares shield. The
fact that in the landlord case we have an additional party in the
person of the lessee in possession whom the common law could have
alternatively chosen as our sole subject for liability cuts even more
against Ultramares as a limiting doctrine since, in the CPA negligence
'
0 8 Supra note 100; Reimann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d
325 (1952). See Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv.
L. REV. 913 at 920-921 (1951).
109 Seavey, supra note 108. But what if our values, and hence our policy judgments,
change? See the California model Biakanja v. Irving, and Wade's comment thereon,
supra note 52.
110 Even the Reimann case, supra note 100, decided in 1952, preceded the new wave
of "products liability" innovations.
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situation, there is no other alternative subject upon whom the re-
sponsibility for the CPA's carelessness may be shifted."'
The modified Ultramares-type case is also analogous to the automo-
bile manufacturer situation (Case 1) since the dealer as a conduit or
funnel through which the manufacturer gets his autos to the ultimate
consumer closely resembles C Company, the CPA's client, which serves
as the conduit for getting the CPA's reports and financial statements
to those who need such periodic reports and for whose benefit the
CPA's independent audit services are primarily rendered-credit
granters, stockholders, and potential investors. Similarly, the city in
Case 4 can be considered a conduit between the waterworks utility
and the private parties who are intended to derive the primary benefit
of the water services as residents of the city." 2
Hence, it would appear that the "privity" requirement will, whether
we like it or not, eventually fall in the CPA case and waterworks
case as it has fallen in the manufacturer's and landlord's liability
situations because this limiting doctrine represents an outmoded lia-
bility-limiting common law policy which may no longer be controlling
due to the widespread prevalence of liability insurance and the ability
to pass the risk of loss on to CPA clients or water utility customers
through the fee or price mechanism." 3 Such a result would provide a
unified theory of common law tort liability through a probable future
revision of the results in Cases 4 and 5 to conform with the recognition
of liability in Cases 1 and 2, except for the apparent inconsistency
with Case 3 where the plaintiff-mother seeking redress for the emo-
tional injury suffered and is denied recovery. The denial of recovery
there could be simply reconciled by classifying the "type" or "char-
acter" of the harm as emotional, but this attachment of labels as an
.easy way out must, in my opinion, be condemned and rejected as a
distinction or device just as untenable as past efforts at characteri-
zation such as "negligent speech," "gross" v. "mere", and "non"-
feasance. Such a "justification" would be wholly spurious. If "finger"
111 The CPA's client, of course, would not be responsible for the CPA's negligence
and would be an alternative risk-bearer only where the client itself participated in a
collusive fraudulent scheme.
112 We here utilize the term "primary benefit" as a measure of use, further reinforc-
ing its similar meaning in the case of financial statements certified by the independent
accountant.
113 See supra notes 107, 121. See also notes 140, 141, infra.
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number 3 can properly be a part of the same "hand" as the other
four cases, there must be a more substantial and meaningful distinc-
tion.
As in the CPA liability case, the danger connected with subjecting
the automobile driver to liability for emotional injuries to friend and
family of the accident victim seems to be the problem of limitless and
unbearable monetary damages." 4 However, as indicated previously,
the risk of emotional injuries to friends and families of accident
victims is not the type of variable which can be insured against on any
sensible rate scale or coverage plan available to auto drivers individually
or as a class. On the other hand, the risks of loss to the CPA can be
insured against and are capable of actuarial measurement." 5
The common law gut reaction to the effect that there must be
some limit on potential liability for tortious conduct which was said
to constitute the need for denying the mother recovery for her emo-
tional injuries"' does not demand complete immunization of the CPA
from liability for negligence. In fact, CPA negligence liability would
not contravene this common law limitation policy because the nature
of the CPA's services itself provides an inherent limitation. This arises
out of the requirement that the investor or lender must show reliance
on the CPA's statements and reports"-in effect, that he would not
have invested or made the loan but for the favorable report of the
CPA on C Company's financial condition. With this inherent limita-
tion in hand, the CPA's liability for negligence would not contravene
the policy of the common law as expressed in those cases denying
recovery to the mother since the liability would not be "limitless"
but rather, restricted to well-defined determinable classes-those third
persons for whose benefit the CPA's services are primarily rendered
and who relied thereon.
The above analytical exercise clearly reveals the "doctrinal strain"
in Ultramares and suggests to the writer five possible courses of future
models of CPA liability for negligent conduct.
(1) Retention of the Ultramares doctrine: recovery for fraud and
negligence so gross as to be tantamount to fraud, but no re-
114Supra note 109.
115 Supra note 113.
116 HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 104, at 1035; Green, supra note 106.
117 Examine the discussion of the "reliance" issue presented in note 56, supra.
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covery for "mere" negligence absent privity of contract.
(2) Ultramares absent the privity requirement: privity stripped
away as a prerequisite and recovery allowed for negligence, as
well as for fraud, but subject to strict requirements as to proof
of both negligent conduct and third party reliance.
(3) Expansion of federal securities act coverage: solely statutory
recovery under a uniform federal regulation as characterized
by the apparent Fischer v. Kletz looseness of standards and
easy liability," with or without the concomitant shifting of
the burden of proof on to the CPA and with or without a "na-
tionalized" common law recovery.
(4) Internal professional regulation as the sole deterrent: no statu-
tory or common law liability with the entire matter left to in-
ternal regulation within the accounting community itself.
(5) Strict liability: absolute CPA liability for any errors appearing
in published certified financial statements without the need
for injured third parties to prove negligence-a combination
of res ipsa loquitur and ultrahazardous activity, coupled with
widespread existence of liability insurance and a superior risk-
bearing ability.
Based upon the voluminous discussion and analyses set forth earlier
in this study, it should be apparent that the retention of the Ultra-
mares doctrine seems unjustifiable in light of currently emerging tort
law concepts" 8 and the sophisticated nature and complexity of the
independent accountant's audit services today." 9 In line with the
same factors, the cogency of a modified Ultramares absent the privity
requirement coupled with the maintenance of strict standards of proof,
as outlined above, should be realized. 20 This type of rule would coin-
cide with the general trend in the "products liability" cases' 2' and
118 Supra notes 101-17.
119 Reexamine notes 71-77, 87-90, and 93-98, and the accompanying text.
120 This dispensation of the privity limitation should proceed along lines similar to the
model set forth by the California Supreme Court in its landmark anti-privity pro-
nouncement, Biakanja v. Irving, supra note 52.
121 An excellent example of the recent trend toward strict liability is the opinion of
the Illinois Supreme Court, not generally regarded as a free-wheeling overly libertarian
judicial body, in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). The
court concluded that lack of privity was no defense to the manufacturer of a defective
product (brake on a motor vehicle) ; that this result is demanded by public policy and
the "justice" of imposing loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the profit. See also
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would have the insured CPA paying for his mistakes to those who
have been thereby injured, just as railroads, automobile manufac-
turers, and soda-pop bottlers are required by the legal system to com-
pensate the victims of their errors of neglect. 122 However, the writer
must emphasize that concomitant with the destruction of the privity
limitation, equity demands the careful maintenance of strict stan-
dards of proof 123 so that the independent accountant is not forced to
become a blanket guarantor of every financial statement to which
he appends his opinion.
The obvious escape hatch which comes to mind is the wholesale
use of disclaimers of opinion by the accountants. It has been recognized
that the widespread use of disclaimers of opinion as a device for avoid-
ing liability would not produce a satisfactory solution, but would only
further compound the troubles by its consequences on the credit
standing of his clients and its ultimate destruction of the account-
tant's very purpose for existence.' 24 This is to say nothing of the fact
that repetitive use of disclaimers on a wholesale basis may be the
quickest means for separating the CPA from his clients (i.e., the
client will find itself another accountant) .125 Alternatively, the inde-
pendent public accountant's fees would become so unreasonably
enormous that their cost would far outweigh their worth with a cor-
related deterioration of the accountant's attestation function. 26
Expansion of the Federal regulations promulgated under the sweep
of the securities legislation of the 1930's would be inadvisable, if
not impossible, at the present time in light of the inherent limitation
Postilion, Products Liability: The Negligence Theory, 53 ILL. B. J. 562 (1965); Noel,
Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964); Metzger, The Social Revolu.
tion in Products Liability, 49 IL. B. J. 710 (1961).
12 2 See Note, 36 IowA L. REv. 319 (1951).
123 Those concerned with a specific delineation of those legal pitfalls present in day-
to-day audit practice should consult Graf and Brown, Accountants' Legal Responsibility,
4 ARTHUR YOUNG J. at 1-14 (Jan. 1957).
124 Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 588, 599 (1967):
"A possible undesirable result of use of disclaimers as a hedge against liability could
arise where accountants, intimidated by the new standard of liability, use disclaimers
even though confident of the accuracy of their audit. Such a practice would hamper the
effectiveness of auditors, and could prove to be a needlessly adverse reflection of the
credit standing of their client."
125 The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
126 See Hanson, supra note 90, at 975.
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on such regulations insofar as the basis for their validity lies in the
interstate securities transactions.12 7 This seems to hinder recovery by
third parties other than stockholders who have relied on the indepen-
dent accountant's misrepresentations, specifically creditors, potential
investors and financial analysts.128 In addition, the correlated problems
of federalism arising out of the snatching of a large chunk of common
law tort liability from the state courts where the litigation has tradi-
tionally rested inevitably seems to creep up.129
Suggested reliance on internal professional regulation as the sole
deterrent to CPA negligence certainly is tempting from a deterrence
standpoint, but clearly is lacking in the compensatory need of the
tort law system to make the injured party whole again. There may
even be grave doubts as to the effectiveness of internal discipline as a
deterrent. Possible internal penalties available at the present time
include termination or suspension of membership in the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and/or the State Society of
CPA's along with the temporary or permanent loss of the license to
practice granted by the particular State. However, the utility of the
membership termination or suspension sanctions are questionable when
the weakness of their administration in the past is considered. In addi-
tion, the revocation of a license by the state normally would be unthink-
able absent the most vile type of fraud and collusive behavior on the
part of the accountant. Further evidence of the inadequacy of internal
discipline as a deterrent is the prevalence of the attitude exemplified
by a recent Journal of Accountancy editorial which urged member
CPAs not to testify "against" colleagues, 3 ° viewed by many outside
the ambit of the accounting profession 131 and even by some within
its own house,132 (and perhaps too vigorously) as being commensurate
127 Cf. Coffey, supra note 21.
128 But see supra note 21.
129 This is especially true in light of the looseness and "easy liability" exemplified by
Fischer v. Kletz, supra note 25.
130 Supra note 2.
131 Recent attacks upon accountants in the press, especially The Wall Street Journal,
have been prompted by such pronouncements. See also supra note 1.
12 Spacek, Letter to the Editor, 120 J. Accv. 2d (No. 5, November 1965), where-
in the writer, a managing partner of Arthur Andersen & Co., suggests that "Lo urge the
profession not to testify at all when it would be against another CPA member is to
ignore the responsibilities that we owe to client and investors . . . . The public will
not expect high standards of performance if we improperly try to protect ourselves
from a proper accountability and thus cover up our deficiencies."
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with denying accountability for the work the CPA does. I3 Such an
editorial pronouncement does have the clear effect of improperly at-
tempting to protect CPAs from a proper measure of personal re-
sponsibility,'34 covering up their deficiencies, and ignoring the moral
obligations owed to clients and investors.' 5
A similar practice has long existed in the organized practice of
medicine but with an interesting twist. The expert medical testimony
"against" colleagues has been discouraged, but has also been used as
a "whip" to weed out "undesirable" practitioners.136 In effect, there
has been a professional allocation of expert testimony on a dis-
criminatory basis137-testimony being discouraged against "good"
doctors, encouraged against the "bad." However, one should seriously
question and challenge the professional association's criteria for dif-
ferentiating the "good" practitioner from the "bad." Because of these
administrative dangers as well as the absence of compensation for the
injured third party plaintiffs, internal professional regulation and
discipline even as a deterrent to CPA negligence seems highly inap-
propriate. Nonetheless, such self-regulation can, and should if adminis-
tered properly, be relied upon by the law with regard to the estab-
lishment of standards of care by which negligent conduct may be
measured.
The final possibility, strict liability for all financial statement er-
rors, would deem the independent accountant's certificate and state-
ments an "ultrahazardous' '1 3s implement similar to an airplane or a
wild beast. At first, this theoretical analogy may appear ridiculous
but a similar rationale has recently developed concerning products lia-
bility litigation, which area it will be remembered was the initial
133"The accounting profession's apparent reluctance to accept legal responsibility
to third parties must be looked upon as a detracting factor in the profession's struggle
to gain full public recognition as a profession." SALMONSON, AUDITING STANDARDS, THE
LAW AND THIRD PARTIES (Ph. D. Dissertation, Univ. of Mich., 1956) at 292-93.
134 Id. See also Note, 36 IowA L. REV. 319 (1951); Hawkins, Professional Negligence
Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REV. 797, 822 (1959).
135 Some have even been brazen enough to hint at incorporating with limited liability
as a solution to the recent rash of lawsuits and publicity. See Zack, The CPA and
Corporate Practice, 37 N.Y. CPA 185, 186 (1967).
136 See Curran, supra note 8, at 538-40.
137 See Regan, supra note 13; Curran, supra note 8, has diagramed a "conspiracy of
silence."
138 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 520 (1935) ; see Note, Absolute Liability for Dangerous
Things, 61 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1948).
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cornerstone of the original assault on privity.1 9 The prevalence of li-
ability insurance among the large public accounting firms is un-
believably extensive. 40 In addition, the risk-bearing ability of most
independent public accounting firms is clearly superior to that of
the ordinary investors who might be injured by reliance on the CPA's
certificate and statements.' 4 ' On the other hand, one should cast
serious doubts upon the deterrence aspect of such absolute liability
without proof of fault, as well as the sense of forcing independent ac-
countants to guaranty their work from all defects. This could only
lead to a total disclaimer of all responsibility in order for the CPA to
survive economically which, in turn, would spell the demise of the at-
testation function and the accountant's economic excuse for existence.
Accountants' liability insurance rates are based on a common risk
pool'4 2 whereunder the rates of one firm are determined on a par with
the rates of others of a similar class. 45 This system may not provide
the optimum risk allocation, which is the subsumed major advantage of
13 9 See generally James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REv. 44 (1955). Some recent
expansions are Biakanja v. Irving, supra note 52, and Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38
Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (1954). Consider again, in this light, the repudiation
of privity in Suvada v. White Motor Co., supra note 121.
140 As long ago as 1959, the minimum loss limit reported by national firms was $5
million, Insurance for Accounting Firms and Practitioner, AICPA, EcoNomics OF
AccoUNTnG PRACTICE, (Bulletin 10, 1959). Scholars prominent in the field of tort law
have suggested that the prevalence of insurance in certain risk areas creates an atmos-
phere in which the extension of liability is inevitable. Professor Ehrenzweig has gone
even further in advocating that in certain cases (hazardous activities) there should be
imposed upon a party the duty to carry liability insurance coverage and should this
duty to insure be breached by failure to insure, liability would automatically result.
See Ehrenzweig, Assurance Obligee-A Comparative Study, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
445 (1950).
14'The significance of the superior risk-bearing ability of a class of potential
defendants such as independent accountants lies in the fact that these abilities seem to
be the cornerstone for the imposition of liability without fault upon members of the
particular class. Professor Morris has suggested that such class liability absent fault
"has drawn criticism," but "seldom evokes widespread outrage." MomRis oN TORTs 248
(1953).
142 In addition, as with other types of liability insurance, the unit cost of limits in
excess of the basic policy limit of liability decreases as the limit gradually increases.
See supra note 140.
143 Insurance, even on the basis of a common risk pool, is not a satisfactory solution
to the problem of accountants' liability. In fact, it has been reported that, as a result
of the recent flood of litigation, only six insurance companies will now handle accoun-
tants' liability policies for large amounts of coverage, and then only as a favor to the
larger firms, whereas as late as 1966 some fifteen insurance companies freely wrote
such policies. See Metz, Accounting Profession, Vexed By Lawsuits, Weighs Responsi-
bility to Shareholders, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1966, Sec. 3 at 1, col. 1.
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strict liability based upon insurance and risk-bearing capacity be-
cause the more careful CPA firms are effectively bearing more than
their share of the total loss due to the common risk pool while the
more careless CPA firms are shifting part of their loss elsewhere
among colleagues in an unfair manner. 44 Nevertheless, some may sug-
gest that this risk allocation data are counteracted by viewing the audit
as an ultrahazardous activity or undertaking containing an inherent
risk.'45 Once this rationale is accepted, there is no great difficulty in
concluding that there is no misallocation of risks because it is the
common activity itself and not the degree of carelessness with which
the activity is undertaken that causes the loss. In any event, the ap-
plicability of the absolute liability rationale to CPA audit services is
certainly questionable, and the palatability of "strict CPA liability"
does not lend much potential for implementation at the present time.
Rather, its proponents should be satisfied with the destruction of the
Ultramares privity citadel. One caveat to the accounting community:
Stubborn clinging to the weak logic of Ultramares may result in the
quite perverse effect of inducing a violent reaction from the legal sys-
tem whereby the negligence route may be by-passed in favor of ab-
solute liability without fault.
To summarize, the Ultramares doctrine will soon fall because of
the following errors made by Judge Cardozo:
(1) Failure to comprehend the nature of the audit function and
the potential "built-in" trichotomy available to separate fraud,
gross negligence and mere negligence. Liability for mere negli-
gence would not be made "coterminous" with liability for
fraud and the three areas of differentiated tainted conduct
may be outlined as follows: (a) Collusion with management
and deliberate misrepresentations (actionable as fraud); (b)
Disregard for generally accepted auditing standards and/or
audit procedures (actionable as gross negligence "tantamount
to fraud"); and (c) Attempt at compliance with the standards
of performance and accepted procedures but carelessness in
this attempt (actionable as mere negligence).
144 See supra note 143. It is therein additionally demonstrated that several companies
have raised their rates by over 30% in order to accomodate any accountants' liability
coverage whatsoever.
145 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 140; MoRRs, supra note 141.
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(2) Assumption that the independent accountant's certificate and
services are rendered "only incidentally" for the use of third
parties and for the "primary benefit" of the accountant's
client, even though it has been clearly demonstrated that the
real benefit accrues to the credit granting, stockholder and
financial analyst segments of the economy who, in fact, require
and demand the CPA's reports and certificate.
(3) Interpretation that the word "public" in the title "certified
public accountant" means only that the CPA's services are
"offered to any member of .the general public," ignoring the
crucial "economic excuse for the CPA's existence"-indepen-
dence, and his function as a safeguard of the public interest
serving as a "professional watchdog" and assuming the high
degree of responsibility associated therewith.
These three factors, coupled with the widespread prevalence of
large amounts of accountants' liability insurance coverage, 46 the
CPA's superior risk-bearing capacity to that of the "average investor,"
and his risk-shifting potential through the fee mechanism, 147 further
reinforced by the CPA's billing of fees to his clients which obviously
includes some premium for the CPA's "independence,"' 48 all demand
that the absence of privity no longer be a bar to suits against certifying
accountants by third party members of the public who suffer loss as a
result of reliance on a report or statement proven to have been prepared
negligently by the independent accountant. This unavoidability is the
eventual thrust of the recent wave of litigation directed against accoun-
tants by investors and credit granters seeking to recoup some measure
of salvage for sour investments. The following incisive comments have
been recently offered concerning this mad rush to the courthouse and
the projected consequences thereof:
Regardless of the reasons for the suits, and although most accountants expect them
to fail, they have generated much concern in the accounting community. While
there is no reason under classic negligence theory to allow accountants to escape
liability to third persons or classes of persons whom they could reasonably have
expected to rely upon their financial reports, the public policy issue once again
arises. It is feared that the future of accounting firms, particularly small ones,
146 Supra notes 140, 142.
147 See supra notes 141, 145.
148 Few would be bold enough to question the fact that the independent CPA is paid
a large premium because of this feature alone. See CAREY, supra note 75.
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might be jeopardized by exposure to such potentially astronomical liability ....
It also seems safe to say that the possible liability of an accounting firm for its
negligence, if a duty of care to third parties were imposed by law, would be
much greater than the potential liability of a tortfeasor causing physical harm.
Obviously, it is not socially desirable to have reputable accounting firms ruined
financially because of one negligent audit.149
It is clear that the CPA should not be made a guarantor of the
absolute accuracy of the financial statements he certifies, 5 ° and, as a
necessary and viable limitation upon such blanket liability to the
public, stringent standards of proof of both negligent conduct and re-
liance must be carefully formulated and scrupulously safeguarded by
the courts. This would serve the needed purpose of limitation without
the logical strain connected with preservation of "privity," while rely-
ing upon the accountants' self-promulgated standards of audit practice
as the proper measure of the prevailing standard of care. In the long
run, such a structured system of responsibility would act to improve
the quality of audit services and to reduce the mounting volume of
litigation focused against the American accountants. It has been con-
vincingly demonstrated that expansion of accountants' liability for
negligence does not possess those inherent dangers feared by some,
either monetarily or in terms of having to verify each and every jour-
nal entry,' 5 ' and that juries have been terribly fair to the accountants
in the cases litigated thus far.' 52 Finally, the judicial "nationalization"
140 Note, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 588, 597 (1967).
150 Prospects for the future clearly indicate that the accounting community cannot
close its eyes and hope that this problem will vanish. See Trueblood, Legal Liability,
CPA, April, 1966, at 2, 3, wherein the AICPA President concludes: "As American busi-
ness grows larger, the potential losses from business failure become greater for both
creditors and investors. Financial distress and failure in business are increasingly accom-
panied by searches for scapegoats. Auditors become one of the searchers' targets."
151 Hawkins, supra note 134, at 822-23: "The cases suggest two considerations as
governing the extent to which verification must be made in the investigative process.
One is the presence or absence of suspicious circumstances. The other is the need for
some reasonable sampling or testing technique, even in the absence of suspicious cir-
cumstances. Both considerations are consistent with the standards set by the accounting
profession-that is, the accountant should first evaluate the system of internal control
to ascertain to what extent it can be relied upon, and then obtain sufficient, competent,
evidential matter upon which to formulate an adequate conclusion respecting the
matter reported."
152 Hawkins, supra note 134, at 823-24, where the writer notes that juries "have
shown their disposition to exonerate the accountant in cases where the accountant could
offer some reasonable explanation for the mistake he made" and that the jury under the
common law negligence formula will produce verdicts "that the accountant profession
can live with."
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of this body of common law liability principles under the penumbra
of the Federal securities acts, as implied by the decision in Fischer v.
Kletz and its overtones of "easy liability,"1 3 is hopefully not to be-
come the answer.
APPENDIX A
POST-ULTRAMARES DECISIONS
1937-In O'Connor v. Ludlan,154 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit adhered to Ultramares in holding, "A mere mistake in the
the balance sheet which is the result of negligence only is not ordinarily
a basis for recovery by a third person."'155 The decision also attempted to
crystallize the judicial thinking on the questions of falsity and intent, in
the following manner. "On the question of falsity, the issue is whether a
true or false impression is created. On the question of intent, fraud may be
established by showing that a false representation has been made. An
intent to deceive may be inferred from a lack of honest representation
and if an audit is so superficial as to be only a pretended audit then the
element of knowledge of falsity is present."' 156
1938-In State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,157 the New York Court of Appeals,
after Mr. Justice Cardozo's departure for the United States Supreme Court
and apparently desirous of following the Ultramares precedent which he
constructed, held that in the absence of a contractual relationship or its
equivalent, accountants cannot be found legally responsible for ordinary
negligence in preparing a certified balance sheet despite their awareness
that the balance sheet will be utilized as an instrumentality for obtaining
credit.158 However, the real import of the State Street Trust case lies
in the majority's clarification of the Ultramares doctrine concerning those
153 See supra note 25.
154 O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758.
155 Id. at 53.
1560d. at 53-54. Compare this language as to intent with the thoughts on the same
subject as recently expressed by the federal district court in Fischer v. Kletz, supra
note 25. Keep in mind the possible creation of a "federal common law" based upon
this much more liberal standard of proof and liability.
157 State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
1581d. at 111, 15 N.E.2d at 423. Judge Finch, writing for the four man majority,
further concluded:
"The foregoing presents abundant evidence from which a jury could find that defendants
knew facts which vitally affected financial worth of Pelz-Greenstein (the client), and
which defendants totally suppressed on the certified balance sheet but disclosed to Pelz-
Greenstein alone . . . .Where the record shows acts on the part of the accountants, as
.outlined above, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that plaintiff has failed to make
out a case for the jury." Id. at 121.
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instances where accountants may be liable to third parties even though
deliberate or "active" fraud may be lacking. The court designated as suf-
ficient bases of liability:
(1) A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the accountant
when there is no knowledge;
(2) A reckless misstatement; or
(3) An opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion
that there is no genuine belief in its truth.159
In other words, heedlessness or reckless disregard for the truth or the
consequences may take the place of deliberate intention and serve as an
actionable tort. It has been suggested that State Street Trust really repre-
sents a subtle but marked shift from the rationale espoused by Cardozo in
Ultramares because a finding of fraud could now be based upon an error
of judgment, which in effect was really negligence.' 60 This view does not,
however, appear justified, and State Street Trust is best viewed as merely
explaining how gross negligence could operate so as to give rise to an
inference of fraudulent intent.
1943-In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Atherton,'6' the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that independent accountants who have notice inci-
dental to the performance of their audit examination that the client intends
to exhibit to creditors and investors the financial statements which they
prepare and certify owe to these third party members of the public a duty
not to assert knowledge where no knowledge exists. It must be noted
that this pronouncement does not present any radical departure from the
Ultramares doctrine since Cardozo clearly viewed such a representation of
knowledge of truth where there was none as recklessness tantamount to
fraudulent intent.
1951-In Chandler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., 16 2 an English case involving a
suit by a third party who relied on the defendant-accountant's certified
balance sheet in making an investment in the audited company, the inde-
pendent accountant's employee admittedly was careless with the perform-
ance of the work entrusted to him and knew specifically that the plaintiff
was relying on his certified financial statements. The majority of the court
reiterated the established rule that false statements are not actionable
in the absence of a contractual obligation, a fiduciary relationship, or
fraud,1 3 or, to put it more bluntly, that merely negligent misstatements
159 Id. at 112.
160 SALMONSON, supra note 133, at 131-37. See also the strong dissent of Judge Lehman
in State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, supra note 157, at 125 and at 128 where
he concluded: "The error of judgment does not indicate a wilfull expression of a false
opinion, or an expression of opinion based on grounds so flimsy that the jury might
conclude that the opinion was not based on genuine belief. To permit recovery in a
case where the evidence does not sustain such a conclusion is to wipe out the dis-
tinction which this court has always drawn and which it reiterated in the Ultramares
case."
161 Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Atherton, 47 N.M. 443, 144 P.2d 157 (1943).
162 Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., 1 All E.R. 426, 2 K.B. 164 (CA 1951).
163 Id. at 437 (Asquith, L. J.) and 443 (Cohen, L. J.). Both Lord Justices clung to
the restrictiveness of Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cases 360 (1889).
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are not actionable absent some relationship of contract or trust between
the actor and the injured third party seeking recovery. A strong dissent by
Lord Denning, however, no doubt foreshadowed things to come. 164 He
argued that the rule regarding recovery for negligent misstatements be made
coextensive with the theory permitting recovery by persons not in privity
for physical injuries "resulting, for example, from the negligent manufacture
of a product, if there is that proximity represented by knowledge of the
actor that a particular third party intends to rely upon the statements
made."' 65 Lord Denning was careful to point out that he would confine
the duty to "cases where the accountant prepares his accounts and makes
his report for the guidance of the very person in the very transaction in
question,"' 166 and stated he "understood" that it would be "going too far"' 6
7
to make an independent accountant liable to any person in the land who
chooses to rely upon the accountants in matters of business.
168
1955-In C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover,169 CIT claimed to have relied on
the results of an audit examination by the CPA firm of Barrow, Wade,
Guthrie & Co. of a subsequently bankrupt trading corporation in originally
making a substantial loan to that client and then refraining from calling in
the loan. Chief Judge Clark of the Second Circuit, speaking for the court
stated, that in the trial court, District Judge Ryan had properly charged
the jury that in order to establish liability on the part of the defendant-
accountants to the plaintiff for ordinary negligence in the preparation of a
post-loan audit, "the jury had to find that these reports had been made for
the primary benefit of the plaintiff lender.' 70 The court held, however,
that the charge to the jury in any event was immaterial and could not
have affected the outcome of the litigation because the jury had found
that the accountants' representations had not been negligently false or
misleading. Some have read Judge Clark's opinion for the Second Circuit
as standing for much more than it actually says.171 It seems a proper
interpretation that the Second Circuit in CIT did no more than clarify
State Street Trust and O'Connor v. Ludlam through resort to the Ultra-
mares term, "primary benefit."
1963-Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd.,172 although involv-
ing the liability of a bank issuing a report on the credit-worthines of a
customer, is a controlling decisional pronouncement over the law of ac-
countants' liability to third parties in England because of its reversal of
164 1d. at 428-436.
165 Id. at 434.
166 Id. at 435.
167 Id.
168 See also Seavey, Comments on Candler v. Crane, 67 L. Q. REv. 466 (1951).
169 C. I. T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955).
170 Id. at 46.
171 See, e.g., Saul Levy's reading of the C.I.T. decision in The C.I.T. Case, 102 J.
Accy. (No. 4, October 1955); Where We Stand Today, 26 N.Y. CPA (January, 1956).
172 Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 575, 3 W. L. R.
101 (H. L. 1963).
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the Chandler case1 78 and the traditional English lumping together of all
such similar situations under the blanket catch-basin of "negligent speech."
Lord Reid, speaking for the House of Lords, concluded that: "If in the
ordinary course of business or professional affairs, a person seeks informa-
tion or advice from another, who is not under contractual or fiduciary obli-
gation to give the information or advice, in circumstances in which a
reasonable man so asked would know that he was being trusted, or that
his skill or judgment was being relied on, then the person replying accepts
a duty to exercise such care as the circumstances require in making his
reply; and a failure to exercise that care will support an action for neg-
ligence if damage results.' 74 Counsel for the Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants in England' 75 have interpreted Hedley Byrne as doing nothing
more than adopting the rule enunciated in Ultramares 76 and also pre-
vailing in South Africa.' 77
APPENDIX B17 8
Excerpts From Complaint Filed in Bank of America National Trust & Sav-
ings Association v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Superior Court of Main
County, State of California, Dept. No. 1, Docket No. 42748
This complaint serves to illustrate the intermingling of fraud, gross negli-
gence and ordinary negligence theories at the trial level as well as the confused
state of the law in terms of what I choose to call a de facto negligence formula
operating in full force under the guise of the Ultramares doctrine, Judge Cardozo's
opinion in that landmark case to the contrary notwithstanding. For example,
whereas the first cause of action in this complaint smacks of intentional mis-
statement keyed to knowledge of falsity the third cause of action likewise utilizes
knowledge coupled with "suppression" of the truth as an additional distinct wrong
for which the bank sought compensation. Further confusion stems from the
fact that it was found necessary to include a fifth cause of action grounded on a
"failure to provide accurate information" which apparently was deemed to be
separate and distinct from both the first and third causes of action in terms of
knowledge or knowledge plus suppression, respectively.
The second cause of action framed in terms of "no reasonable ground" for
belief is, of course, an offshoot of the Ultramares legacy akin to reckless disregard
for the truth sufficient to supplant intent by raising an inference of fraud. The
173 Candler v. Crane, supra note 162.
174 Supra note 172, at 584.
175 The Accountant (England), August 7, 1965.
176 Examine the treatment of Hedley Byrne as an "extension" of CPA liability in
Great Britain in 120 J. Accy. 66 (No. 4, October 1965).
177 Herschel v. Mrupi, 1954 S. A. 464.
178 Comments on the recent settlement and undisclosed details thereof appear in note 6,
supra.
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fifth cause of action, again, may constitute duplicity in light of the reckless dis-
regard theory espoused by the second cause of action, as apparently it likewise
manifests with regard to the first or third causes of action.
The fourth cause of action seems confined in its entirety to carelessness or
simple negligence, implicitly repudiating the Ultramares exclusion of such a remedy.
It is, therefore, a shame analytically that the case was settled before trial for the
treatment of this negligence cause of action in the California courts would no
doubt have been instructive in light of past assaults on privity in that state.' 79
The disposition of the California courts to destroy privity as a limitation upon
tort liability may readily explain the pre-trial settlement of this case by the
defendant-CPA firm which had earlier indicated for public consumption in the
press a preference for having "the matter litigated on its merits.' 80 Finally, the
sixth cause of action was framed in terms of a statutory violation of a rule of
professional conduct promulgated by the State's Board of Accountancy.
The following excerpts from the complaint may further aid in clarifying the
above-discussed matters:
VI
BANK is informed and believes and on such information and belief alleges
that PEAT was retained by OTIS prior to June, 1958, to conduct annual audits
and to issue accountants' reports and financial statements concerning OTIS's
financial condition and to perform other accounting services. In 1960 PEAT pre-
pared Consolidated Financial Statements of OTIS and its subsidiaries as of
June 30, 1960, and rendered its opinion with respect thereto on or about October 3,
1960 (hereinafter referred to as the "1960 Report"). By the 1960 Report and by
prior Consolidated Financial Statements and opinions, PEAT represented, and
intended to represent to the creditors of OTIS to whom OTIS might apply for
credit, or for the continuance of credit, or to whom OTIS might supply the 1960
Report and said Consolidated Financial Statements and opinions, that PEAT had
made careful examinations and audits of the accounts, books and records of
OTIS, that in PEAT's opinion the 1960 Report and said prior Consolidated
Financial Statements presented fairly the true consolidated financial condition of
OTIS and its subsidiaries, and that the 1960 Report and each of said prior
Consolidated Financial Statements were based upon such careful examination
and audit.
VII
The 1960 Report contained the following representations, among others, which
were willfully suggested and asserted as facts:
A. PEAT's examination was made in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards.
B. The 1960 Report, with related notes, presented fairly the financial position
of OTIS and its subsidiaries as of June 30, 1960, and the results of OTIS's
operation for the year then ended, in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles, applied on a basis consistent with that of the pre-
ceding fiscal year.
179 See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving, supra note 52.
180 See the Wall Street Journal account in the text accompanying note 4, supra.
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C. Note 5 in explanation of the entries for 'Acceptances, loans and bills pay-
able to banks' and 'Long-term debt' states:
Note 5-Assets Pledged
'Acceptances, loans and bills payable to banks, $17,971,973 at June
30, 1960, principally relate to coffee import financing under collateral
agreements with various banks. Acceptances of $10,524,060 are col-
lateralized by trust receipts on coffee and the proceeds therefrom. De-
mand loans and advances of $4,007,064 arise from matured acceptances.
Other bills, drafts and notes totalling $3,440,849 are unsecured.
'The following assets are pledged as security for long-term debt (in
addition to the pledging of capital stock of certain acquired subsidiaries):
Net book value
Notes receivable $ 368,690
San Francisco real estate 403,246
Panama real estate 113,240
$ 885,176
D. The 1960 Report represented the Current Assets for the year ended June 30,
1960, in part as follows:
Trade accounts receivable $ 7,167,350
Notes receivable 1,615,870
Marketable securities 618,858
Property in course of sale 2,004,620
Total current assets $24,978,494
E. The 1960 Report represented certain 'Real estate held for sale' as an asset
with a value of $1,676,215.
F. The 1960 Report represented that the 'Total current liabilities' were
$22,082,974.
G. The 1960 Report represented that the consolidated net loss for the year
ended June 30, 1960, was $828,328.
VIII
The 1960 Report failed to disclose that OTIS was out-of-trust in a substantial
amount as of June 30, 1960. As used herein, the expression 'out-of-trust' means
failure of a trustee to comply with its obligations as set forth in an applicable
trust receipt. . . . Under the terms of such trust receipts, OTIS, as trustee, was
required to hold certain documents and entrusted goods in trust for the benefit
of BANK, as entrustor, for certain specified purposes subject to BANK's security
interest. OTIS was to account by delivering the proceeds of any sale of entrusted
goods in whatever form received to BANK immediately upon receipt thereof by
OTIS, to be applied to OTIS's related debt to BANK, provided that if proceeds
were in the form of notes, bills, receivables, acceptances, or in any form other
than cash, they need not be applied until non-cash proceeds were converted to
cash by payment. A failure by OTIS to make such delivery or application would
make OTIS 'out-of-trust.'
IX
BANK is informed and believes, and on such information and belief alleges,
the 1960 Report was prepared and more than one copy of the 1960 Report was
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delivered to OTIS in the City and County of San Francisco on or about October 3,
1960. OTIS delivered one of such copies to BANK in San Francisco on Decem-
ber 5, 1960. OTIS, in accordance with its past practice and in accordance with
the usage of such reports, furnished the copy of the 1960 Report to BANK in
order to obtain credit for the conduct of its business, which practice and usage
was known to PEAT at all times mentioned herein; PEAT also knew that BANK
would rely on said statement in the extension of credit to OTIS.
X
In reliance upon the 1960 Report and prior Consolidated Financial Statements
of OTIS prepared by PEAT and furnished to BANK by OTIS, BANK extended
credit secured by trust receipts to OTIS between June 1, 1961, and November 9,
1961, in various amounts including credit in the amount of $3,550,885.91.
XI
No part of said credit in the amount of $3,550,885.91 has been repaid. A
schedule of said indebtedness showing the credit extended in the form of bankers'
acceptances with the date of maturity of each . . . and the balance owing to
BANK relative to each such acceptance is attached hereto . ...
XII
The 1960 Report of PEAT was incorrect, untrue, false, and misleading in
the following respects, among others:
A. As of June 30, 1960, OTIS was 'out-of-trust,' which fact, although known
to PEAT, was not reported by PEAT.
B. PEAT represented in its 1960 Report in Note 5, set forth in Paragraph VII
hereof, that OTIS was complying with its obligations to secured creditors
on bankers' acceptances and trust receipts for coffee, which was not true
and which PEAT knew was not true.
C. PEAT overstated the amount of the assets of OTIS listed under the follow-
ing categories in the 1960 Report: 'Trade accounts receivable,' 'Notes re-
ceivable,' 'Marketable securities,' 'Property in course of sale,' 'Total cur-
rent assets,' and 'Real estate held for sale.'
D. PEAT understated the amount of liabilities of OTIS listed under the cate-
gory 'Total current liabilities' in the 1960 Report.
E. PEAT understated the amount of consolidated net loss of OTIS under
the category 'Net income (loss)' in the 1960 Report for the year ended
June 30, 1960.
XIII
All of the aforesaid representations of material facts by PEAT in the 1960
Report were intended by PEAT to induce creditors of OTIS, including BANK,
to extend credit to OTIS from time to time in the future. The 1960 Report was
prepared by PEAT as a firm of certified public accountants registered with the
State of California and was unqualified, except as to certain subsidiaries.
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XIV
PEAT in the 1960 Report suggested as facts those material representations
contained and alleged in Paragraph VII hereinabove. Said material representations
were not true and PEAT knew at the time they were made that they were not true.
XV
BANK extended credit and loaned the amounts of money to OTIS in the man-
ner hereinbefore alleged in Paragraphs X and XI in the reasonable belief that
such loans initially secured by trust receipts would continue to be secured by
trust receipts until repaid with the proceeds of the sale of the property covered
by the trust receipts. At the time said loans were made to OTIS, BANK did not
know that OTIS was out-of-trust, or that PEAT overstated the amount of assets
in the 1960 Report in the categories of 'Trade accounts receivable,' 'Notes re-
ceivable,' 'Marketable securities,' 'Property in course of sale,' 'Total current
assets' and 'Real estate held for sale,' or that PEAT understated the amount of
'Total current liabilities' in the 1960 Report, or that PEAT understated the
amount of consolidated net loss . . . . BANK would not have extended credit
and loaned the amounts of money or any amounts of money to OTIS in the
manner hereinbefore alleged in Paragraphs X and XI, or in any other manner,
if it had known that OTIS was or had been out-of-trust, or that PEAT over-
stated the amount of assets in the 1960 Report . . . . or that PEAT understated
the amount of 'Total current liabilities' . . . , or that PEAT understated the
amount of consolidated net loss of OTIS . ...
XVI
As a direct and proximate result of the extension of credit and making of
loans to OTIS as hereinbefore alleged, BANK has been damaged in the amount
of THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUN-
DRED EIGHTY-FIVE and 91/100 DOLLARS ($3,550,885.91), the amount
unpaid by OTIS on the credit and loans referred to in Paragraphs X and XI
hereof, together with interest on the principal amount of each acceptance listed
in Exhibit C hereof from the date of its maturity to the date of repayment to
BANK.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
For a Second Cause of Action against Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff
alleges:
I
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and all of the
allegations contained in Paragraphs I through XIII and XV through XVII of its
First Cause of Action hereinabove set forth.
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II
PEAT asserted as facts those material representations contained and alleged in
Paragraph VII of BANK's First Cause of Action. Said representations were not
true and at the time said representations were made PEAT had no reasonable
ground for believing them to be true.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
For a Third Cause of Action against Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff
alleges:
I
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and all of the
allegations contained in Paragraphs I through XIII and XV through XVII of its
First Cause of Action hereinabove set forth.
II
PEAT failed to disclose and in fact suppressed material facts respecting which
it is alleged in Paragraph XII of BANK's First Cause of Action herein that the
1960 Report was incorrect, untrue, false and misleading.
III
PEAT knew said undisclosed facts were material, knew BANK would not
extend credit or lend further sums of money to OTIS if BANK were apprised of
said facts, and PEAT knew further that BANK was unaware of said facts. Facts
were communicated by PEAT in the 1960 Report and prior Consolidated Financial
Statements of OTIS likely to mislead creditors of OTIS, including BANK, and
BANK was misled for want of communication of the facts which were suppressed
as alleged in Paragraph II of this Third Cause of Action.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
For a Fourth Cause of Action against Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff
alleges:
I
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and all of the
allegations contained in Paragraphs I through IX, XIII, and XV through XVII
of its First Cause of Action hereinabove set forth.
II
In the preparation of the 1960 Report, and prior Consolidated Financial State-
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ments of OTIS prepared by PEAT, PEAT negligently failed to exercise that
degree of care or skill required by law in the following respects:
A. It failed to act with that degree of care or skill commonly exercised by
certified public accountants in the community of San Francisco, California.
B. It failed to comply with Section 58 of Title 16 of the Administrative Code
of the State of California, issued pursuant to Section 5018 of the Business
and Professions Code.
III
PEAT was careless and negligent in its audit and its preparation and issue of
the 1960 Report in failing accurately, fairly and clearly to report the financial
condition of OTIS, as alleged in Paragraph XII of BANK's First Cause of Action.
IV
As a result of said negligence and carelessness, the 1960 Report was incorrect,
untrue, false and misleading in material respects and failed to present fairly
the financial position of OTIS and subsidiaries and the result of their operations
for the period ending June 30, 1960, in conformity with generally accepted account-
ing principles applied on a basis consistent with that of preceding fiscal years,
to-wit, in failing to report that OTIS was 'out-of-trust,' in overstating the amount
of assets . . . , in understating the amount of liabilities . . . , and in understating
the amount of the consolidated net loss . . . BANK extended credit and made
loans, and suffered loss and damage as alleged in Paragraph XVI of BANK's
First Cause of Action, as a direct and proximate result of PEAT's negligence and
carelessness as aforesaid.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
For a Fifth Cause of Action against Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff
alleges:
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and all of the
allegations contained in Paragraphs I through XI, XIII, and XV through XVII
of its First Cause of Action hereinabove set forth.
II
In the 1960 Report, and in prior Consolidated Financial Statements of OTIS
prepared by PEAT, PEAT undertook to provide accurate information of facts
concerning the financial status of OTIS, and to report what was disclosed by an
investigation and review of the financial records of OTIS conducted in accordance
with generally accepted accounting standards.
III
PEAT did not provide accurate information concerning the financial status of
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OTIS and did not report fully material facts and information discovered in the
course of its investigation and review of the financial records of OTIS.
IV
BANK extended credit and made loans, and suffered loss and damage as
alleged in Paragraph XVI of BANK's First Cause of Action, as a direct and
proximate result of PEAT's failure to provide accurate information and to fully
report material facts and information discovered as hereinabove alleged in Para-
graph II of this Fifth Cause of Action.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
For a Sixth Cause of Action against Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff
alleges:
I
Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and all of the
allegations contained in Paragraphs I through XI, XIII, and XV through XVII
of its First Cause of Action hereinabove set forth.
II
The California State Board of Accountancy has adopted rules of professional
conduct to which PEAT is, and at all times mentioned herein was, subject. Rule 58
of Title 16 of the California Administrative Code was in effect and applicable to
PEAT. The purpose of Rule 58 was, and is, to enable creditors, stockholders and
others who receive financial statements to determine the extent to which such
statements may be relied upon. Compliance with Rule 58 was mandatory upon
PEAT, and PEAT's opinions which were included in the 1960 Report, and said
prior consolidated statements, did not comply with Rule 58.
III
BANK extended credit and made loans, and suffered loss and damage as alleged
in Paragraph XVI of BANK's First Cause of Action, as a direct and proximate
result of PEAT's failure to comply with Rule 58 'of Title 16 of the California
Administrative Code.
WHEREFORE, BANK prays judgment against Defendants, and each of them,
as follows:
1. Damages in the amount of THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE and 91/100 DOLLARS
(3,550,885.91), plus interest to date of payment;
2. BANK's costs of suit incurred herein; and
3. Such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper."
